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Causation and Resources
“At least, it seems to have become inevitable once two dangers
for the union had been passed. One of these was the threat of
intervention from abroad. The other was the possibility of military
disaster resulting from the enemy’s superior skill or luck on the
battlefield, from his ability to make decisive use of his
power-in-being before the stronger potential of the Union could be
fully developed and brought into play”. Richard Current, God and the
Strongest Battlefield, Why the North Won the War -1996
A journal entry from John Quincy Adams in 1820 during the
Missouri Compromise debates... He is discussing the slavery issue
with then friend John Calhoun.
Quote: Adams Journal, 1820:
I had some conversations with Calhoun on the slave question
pending in Congress. He said he did not think it would produce a
dissolution of the Union, but if it should, the South would be
from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and
defensive, with Great Britain. I said that would be returning to
the colonial state. He said, yes, pretty much, but it would be
forced upon them.
I only point this out because of how apparent
this idea must have been to the secessionists a full 40 years before
the Civil War. I'm not sure it properly weights the idea heavily in
favor of this cause, but I do see real expectation early - and from
Calhoun - a man who played a significant role in developing
secession all through the 1840s and 50s.
Clearly the South thought cotton was an important enough resource to
draw in England.
...and here's where MB's poor confederate leadership probably
dovetails with the English-alliance cause. I think it was mistake
(even if it seemed logical at the time) for the south to put an
embargo on cotton to limit supply even more severely. From what I've
read, even the English thought this didn't help their cause. On top
of that, Davis apparently had several tons of surplus cotton
destroyed when it might have be used in some way to actually make
money for the south.
Many of the historians I've read agree with the poor administrative
job the Confederacy did - but almost all point out that the
Confederacy had far greater obstacles in front of them economically
than the North.
I have also read that Davis had three very annoying habits that hurt
him - his unrelenting habit of micro-managing things including how
generals operated in the field, his habit of carrying a grudge, and
his poor skills in communicating to those under him why he was
making certain decisions.
I think most of us here are familiar with his grudge problem - these
are well-documented in several places. I suppose we could also point
to his lack of practicality when it came to rewarding success in the
field (Nathan Bedford Forrest comes to mind). Contrast this with
Lincoln, who merely wanted someone who showed he could win. Davis
was unable to find that diamond in the rough - his version of
Lincoln's Grant.
Another theory that gets little mention is from
David Donald’s “Died of Democracy” theory. It may not have much
weight, but it’s kind of novel. It harkens back a little to MB’s
pointer than the southern congress was almost totally inept.
Donald suggests that of the two geographic
forces, the South was far more democratic in its approach. It was,
in fact, so democratic that it rarely got anything done politically
or militarily. Simply put, the South was much less interested in
working through authoritarian and centralized command structures.
Of the two sides, the South was far less
regimented culturally and professionally. Many soldiers of the
overseer class didn’t take kindly to orders, and early on orders
were interpreted more broadly [according to British observers
apparently]. Of the many things that affected both armies
(stragglers in the field and the election of officers by popularity)
much of the individualism appears far more pronounced in the
Confederate army.
Politically, the Davis government was far more
lenient than the Lincoln administration. Freedom of Speech was never
hampered and freedom from arbitrary arrest was almost never
enforced. Davis would never consider suppressing the writ of habeas
corpus and did so only when Richmond was threatened. Contrast that
to the Lincoln administration where it was suspended often with a
heavy hand.
Davis remained largely apolitical compared to
the Lincoln administration (especially in the later years). Davis
refused to attempt to build political coalitions or to support
gubernatorial elections within the confederacy – allowing far more
discordant opinions to reign within the government. Letting the
northern soldiers take leave to vote in the 1864 elections was
another thing that remained largely unexplored in the South.
In other words, the South’s management style
was far too weak for the circumstances at hand.
I think it's fair to say you're absolutely right in terms of
public activities and discourse. The public "impact" as you say may
not have been fully understood until the 40's and 50's. The
Pandora's box of slavery, however, was opened in the House of
Representatives in 1835 when the petition was read to eliminate
slavery from the nations' capital. From that point forward, every
congressman at least formulated concrete opinions on slavery. A side
was taken. Voting blocs began to be arranged. Congressmen who had
voiced nothing on the subject officially went on record. Newspapers
opened the topic as Congress gave them something to write about.
This Washington D.C. debate even stirred Lincoln 12 years later as
he was making his way through his congressional seating. I believe
this debate would continue to be a permanent discussion in Congress
on some level from this point forward.
I believe after the Missouri Compromise 15 years earlier things had
remained largely quiet inside congress. It was presumed by the north
that slavery would probably die out - as Daniel Webster had
suggested. This obviously was not happening in 1835. Calhoun's star
rose and slave states were added. The north just went along, either
not interested or knowing there was nothing to be done.
Abolitionists were a rather tiny minority - and "abolition" pretty
much a bad word everywhere.
I think several things stirred the debate inside Washington D.C.
that the general public may not have understood. The first was the
fact that slaves were heavily trafficked inside Washington. The
largest slave trading warehouse - Franklin and Armfield - was only
seven blocks from the Capitol (that comment is from memory but I
think the source is "The Mighty Scourge", McPherson, 2007).
The reason that was important - and why the petition was probably
read in the first place (and re-read in proceeding years) - was
because many government officials in Washington were starting to be
embarrassed by local slave trading so close to the capitol. Many
foreign dignitaries were in D.C. and commented on the unsavory look
of it.
The other thing I'm inclined to believe was that the scoreboard was
started. As congressmen began to stake out positions, the idea of
slave states vs. free states as political football truly began in
earnest. Which side accumulated yardage became critically important
- as part of the public record at least. Arkansas and Michigan were
in the queue. Texas was starting to look inviting. Their meaning to
the legislative bodies had significant weight now.
We also begin to see indications of the new southern slave rationale
in the late 1830s - the paternal, "The slaves can't take care of
themselves, we have to take care of them" idea. The concept that
slavery was a justifiable good - not just a temporary necessity
until it runs it's course - made for a new argument that the north
felt should be debated.
In 1835 - as William Lee Miller puts it - slavery for the south was
an interest.
Slavery for the north was a sentiment.
The south was far stronger in terms of positioning. The southern
politicians were more ideologically bound and had the strongest
hand.
But the debate was now open. The public could finally bear witness
and began the process of deciding for themselves. I think 1835 is
the official beginning. The 1840s and 1850's would force the issue
everywhere, but I think in 1835 the gun sounded. For the record, the
kickoff was by Congressman Slade from Maine.
Any by the way, I will absolutely agree with you that in the 1850's
the public intoxication started in earnest [gratuitous tailgate
party imagery for the sake of the overall football metaphor].
The greatest percentage of southern congressional leaders, in
both national and state legislatures, were slave holders. Even if
the general public of the south was not fully invested in slavery,
the commitment to the congressional argument of slavery at all
levels was nearly total.
Secondly, there is an ambiguous understanding of what anti-slavery
fully meant to the south (I touch upon this in my earlier post).
It's easy for Ralph Waldo Emerson to make an anti-slavery speech by
illustrating the horrors of slavery. The problem is that
abolitionist never went the next step of understanding how so many
freed slaves would integrate themselves after emancipation - and
whether violent retribution would occur. It certainly wouldn't be
inflicted on anyone in Massachusetts, but violence was, I believe,
at least a 50-50 proposition for most southern minds who grappled
with the concept of millions of slaves suddenly free in the south.
The reason abolition agitation is important is that it made the
south push back with a far more militant stance. As abolition grew,
the need to defend slavery would become more adamant and
intractable. Positions became locked, and hence, other issues became
no more negotiable.
In 1835, when congressman Slade brought a petition before the House
of Rep concerning the dissolution of institutionalized slavery in
Washington D.C., his petition was not just tabled by southerners, it
was initially rejected. No petition prior to 1835 had ever been
"rejected" from being seen. There was no protocol for it. In fact,
they discovered that it could NOT be "rejected" because there was no
protocol to actually reject a petition from being witnessed in the
congressional history of this country.
Amazingly, the southern congressmen began a tirade of name-calling
that bordered on the bizarre. The supporters of the petition -
exactly 132 abolitionists from Maine - were considered so
threatening to the south that they were publicly called "murderers"
and "rapists" by well-know southern congressmen - even though
abolition had noting to do with such crimes. The emotional outcry
did not fit the cause. This petition was extremely minor.
Congressmen Slade did not even agree on the petitions himself! He
hadn't even spoken to support it!
If we encapsulate that emotion in 1835, project it forward to an
even more emotional 1858 or so congressional environment, I think we
can imagine the very highly charged and opinionated atmosphere. I
can't imagine any political debate going forward, on any subject
that separated north-south economies, and I have always believed the
slavery issue was the emotional cup that kept spilling over into
these other areas.
Given that, I think your argument has plenty of merit on
intellectual grounds. I only argue that much of what goes on inside
Washington is both emotional and personal, and the merits of
something like a tariffs cause can never reach the heights of
concern that slavery could. Nor could it trigger the publics fear
like slavery could. In essence, I have trouble giving equal weight
to the other options on the table.
Or to put in another way, I "weight" slavery perhaps more the same
way Kelly does than the way you do.
I will also now admit the problem with my position is that it
projects emotion into places where all we have for determining
emotion is the words they spoke over 150 years ago. That's a pretty
small table to use for my platform. Nevertheless, I'm comfortable
using it
Slavery WAS& IS ethically and morally wrong. but it was an
accepted and time honored instituion of this country up until that
point in time and forever a blemish upon our past however as much a
part of who we are today as a nation as anything else. We are not
the first country to have had an institution of Slavery or were we
the last.
Before I start here, let me say I agree with most everything you
said. Context and public perception cannot be ignored in the times
that are discussed.
That said, I believe your comment is exaggerated. The "time-honored"
tradition of slavery had been ridiculed openly for almost
two-hundred years. I agree that it was politically acceptable, but
that degree of acceptance was based on a defined southern power bloc
of slave-owning Congressmen for nearly the entire colonial and
antebellum periods.
Quakers were openly anti-slavery and published newspapers on the
subject. Before we marginalize Quakers, I think it's important to
remember that in the early 18th century Quakers made up almost
one-fifth of the entire American population for a few years. They
significantly influenced people like Ben Franklin who added his name
to the 1791 petition to eliminate slavery.
Actually, it may be best to actually start a topic on this context -
which I'll try to do soon. My point really is that the the
appearance that institutionalized slavery was 'time-honored" was
true only in a southern-dominated Congress and perhaps within the
aristocratic plantation owners. Outside of that, there was wide
discussion and a variety of views ranging from ambivalent to
negative.
I realize that the issue was still a "northern" issue, yet I
strongly feel that the south's protection of it - while not
necessarily vocal in the mainstream south - was enormously
important. As I said in another post, a south without white
supremacy was very scary.
Lincoln and Slavery
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