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Causation and Resources

“At least, it seems to have become inevitable once two dangers for the union had been passed. One of these was the threat of intervention from abroad. The other was the possibility of military disaster resulting from the enemy’s superior skill or luck on the battlefield, from his ability to make decisive use of his power-in-being before the stronger potential of the Union could be fully developed and brought into play”. Richard Current, God and the Strongest Battlefield, Why the North Won the War -1996


A journal entry from John Quincy Adams in 1820 during the Missouri Compromise debates... He is discussing the slavery issue with then friend John Calhoun.
Quote:
Adams Journal, 1820:
I had some conversations with Calhoun on the slave question pending in Congress. He said he did not think it would produce a dissolution of the Union, but if it should, the South would be from necessity compelled to form an alliance, offensive and defensive, with Great Britain. I said that would be returning to the colonial state. He said, yes, pretty much, but it would be forced upon them.
I only point this out because of how apparent this idea must have been to the secessionists a full 40 years before the Civil War. I'm not sure it properly weights the idea heavily in favor of this cause, but I do see real expectation early - and from Calhoun - a man who played a significant role in developing secession all through the 1840s and 50s.

Clearly the South thought cotton was an important enough resource to draw in England.

...and here's where MB's poor confederate leadership probably dovetails with the English-alliance cause. I think it was mistake (even if it seemed logical at the time) for the south to put an embargo on cotton to limit supply even more severely. From what I've read, even the English thought this didn't help their cause. On top of that, Davis apparently had several tons of surplus cotton destroyed when it might have be used in some way to actually make money for the south.

Many of the historians I've read agree with the poor administrative job the Confederacy did - but almost all point out that the Confederacy had far greater obstacles in front of them economically than the North.

I have also read that Davis had three very annoying habits that hurt him - his unrelenting habit of micro-managing things including how generals operated in the field, his habit of carrying a grudge, and his poor skills in communicating to those under him why he was making certain decisions.

I think most of us here are familiar with his grudge problem - these are well-documented in several places. I suppose we could also point to his lack of practicality when it came to rewarding success in the field (Nathan Bedford Forrest comes to mind). Contrast this with Lincoln, who merely wanted someone who showed he could win. Davis was unable to find that diamond in the rough - his version of Lincoln's Grant.
 

Another theory that gets little mention is from David Donald’s “Died of Democracy” theory.  It may not have much weight, but it’s kind of novel. It harkens back a little to MB’s pointer than the southern congress was almost totally inept.

Donald suggests that of the two geographic forces, the South was far more democratic in its approach. It was, in fact, so democratic that it rarely got anything done politically or militarily. Simply put, the South was much less interested in working through authoritarian and centralized command structures.

Of the two sides, the South was far less regimented culturally and professionally. Many soldiers of the overseer class didn’t take kindly to orders, and early on orders were interpreted more broadly [according to British observers apparently]. Of the many things that affected both armies (stragglers in the field and the election of officers by popularity) much of the individualism appears far more pronounced in the Confederate army.

Politically, the Davis government was far more lenient than the Lincoln administration. Freedom of Speech was never hampered and freedom from arbitrary arrest was almost never enforced. Davis would never consider suppressing the writ of habeas corpus and did so only when Richmond was threatened. Contrast that to the Lincoln administration where it was suspended often with a heavy hand.

Davis remained largely apolitical compared to the Lincoln administration (especially in the later years). Davis refused to attempt to build political coalitions or to support gubernatorial elections within the confederacy – allowing far more discordant opinions to reign within the government. Letting the northern soldiers take leave to vote in the 1864 elections was another thing that remained largely unexplored in the South.

In other words, the South’s management style was far too weak for the circumstances at hand.


I think it's fair to say you're absolutely right in terms of public activities and discourse. The public "impact" as you say may not have been fully understood until the 40's and 50's. The Pandora's box of slavery, however, was opened in the House of Representatives in 1835 when the petition was read to eliminate slavery from the nations' capital. From that point forward, every congressman at least formulated concrete opinions on slavery. A side was taken. Voting blocs began to be arranged. Congressmen who had voiced nothing on the subject officially went on record. Newspapers opened the topic as Congress gave them something to write about. This Washington D.C. debate even stirred Lincoln 12 years later as he was making his way through his congressional seating. I believe this debate would continue to be a permanent discussion in Congress on some level from this point forward.

I believe after the Missouri Compromise 15 years earlier things had remained largely quiet inside congress. It was presumed by the north that slavery would probably die out - as Daniel Webster had suggested. This obviously was not happening in 1835. Calhoun's star rose and slave states were added. The north just went along, either not interested or knowing there was nothing to be done. Abolitionists were a rather tiny minority - and "abolition" pretty much a bad word everywhere.

I think several things stirred the debate inside Washington D.C. that the general public may not have understood. The first was the fact that slaves were heavily trafficked inside Washington. The largest slave trading warehouse - Franklin and Armfield - was only seven blocks from the Capitol (that comment is from memory but I think the source is "The Mighty Scourge", McPherson, 2007).

The reason that was important - and why the petition was probably read in the first place (and re-read in proceeding years) - was because many government officials in Washington were starting to be embarrassed by local slave trading so close to the capitol. Many foreign dignitaries were in D.C. and commented on the unsavory look of it.

The other thing I'm inclined to believe was that the scoreboard was started. As congressmen began to stake out positions, the idea of slave states vs. free states as political football truly began in earnest. Which side accumulated yardage became critically important - as part of the public record at least. Arkansas and Michigan were in the queue. Texas was starting to look inviting. Their meaning to the legislative bodies had significant weight now.

We also begin to see indications of the new southern slave rationale in the late 1830s - the paternal, "The slaves can't take care of themselves, we have to take care of them" idea. The concept that slavery was a justifiable good - not just a temporary necessity until it runs it's course - made for a new argument that the north felt should be debated.

In 1835 - as William Lee Miller puts it - slavery for the south was an interest. Slavery for the north was a sentiment. The south was far stronger in terms of positioning. The southern politicians were more ideologically bound and had the strongest hand.

But the debate was now open. The public could finally bear witness and began the process of deciding for themselves. I think 1835 is the official beginning. The 1840s and 1850's would force the issue everywhere, but I think in 1835 the gun sounded. For the record, the kickoff was by Congressman Slade from Maine.

Any by the way, I will absolutely agree with you that in the 1850's the public intoxication started in earnest [gratuitous tailgate party imagery for the sake of the overall football metaphor].


The greatest percentage of southern congressional leaders, in both national and state legislatures, were slave holders. Even if the general public of the south was not fully invested in slavery, the commitment to the congressional argument of slavery at all levels was nearly total.

Secondly, there is an ambiguous understanding of what anti-slavery fully meant to the south (I touch upon this in my earlier post). It's easy for Ralph Waldo Emerson to make an anti-slavery speech by illustrating the horrors of slavery. The problem is that abolitionist never went the next step of understanding how so many freed slaves would integrate themselves after emancipation - and whether violent retribution would occur. It certainly wouldn't be inflicted on anyone in Massachusetts, but violence was, I believe, at least a 50-50 proposition for most southern minds who grappled with the concept of millions of slaves suddenly free in the south.

The reason abolition agitation is important is that it made the south push back with a far more militant stance. As abolition grew, the need to defend slavery would become more adamant and intractable. Positions became locked, and hence, other issues became no more negotiable.

In 1835, when congressman Slade brought a petition before the House of Rep concerning the dissolution of institutionalized slavery in Washington D.C., his petition was not just tabled by southerners, it was initially rejected. No petition prior to 1835 had ever been "rejected" from being seen. There was no protocol for it. In fact, they discovered that it could NOT be "rejected" because there was no protocol to actually reject a petition from being witnessed in the congressional history of this country.

Amazingly, the southern congressmen began a tirade of name-calling that bordered on the bizarre. The supporters of the petition - exactly 132 abolitionists from Maine - were considered so threatening to the south that they were publicly called "murderers" and "rapists" by well-know southern congressmen - even though abolition had noting to do with such crimes. The emotional outcry did not fit the cause. This petition was extremely minor. Congressmen Slade did not even agree on the petitions himself! He hadn't even spoken to support it!

If we encapsulate that emotion in 1835, project it forward to an even more emotional 1858 or so congressional environment, I think we can imagine the very highly charged and opinionated atmosphere. I can't imagine any political debate going forward, on any subject that separated north-south economies, and I have always believed the slavery issue was the emotional cup that kept spilling over into these other areas.

Given that, I think your argument has plenty of merit on intellectual grounds. I only argue that much of what goes on inside Washington is both emotional and personal, and the merits of something like a tariffs cause can never reach the heights of concern that slavery could. Nor could it trigger the publics fear like slavery could. In essence, I have trouble giving equal weight to the other options on the table.

Or to put in another way, I "weight" slavery perhaps more the same way Kelly does than the way you do.

I will also now admit the problem with my position is that it projects emotion into places where all we have for determining emotion is the words they spoke over 150 years ago. That's a pretty small table to use for my platform. Nevertheless, I'm comfortable using it


Slavery WAS& IS ethically and morally wrong. but it was an accepted and time honored instituion of this country up until that point in time and forever a blemish upon our past however as much a part of who we are today as a nation as anything else. We are not the first country to have had an institution of Slavery or were we the last.

Before I start here, let me say I agree with most everything you said. Context and public perception cannot be ignored in the times that are discussed.

That said, I believe your comment is exaggerated. The "time-honored" tradition of slavery had been ridiculed openly for almost two-hundred years. I agree that it was politically acceptable, but that degree of acceptance was based on a defined southern power bloc of slave-owning Congressmen for nearly the entire colonial and antebellum periods.

Quakers were openly anti-slavery and published newspapers on the subject. Before we marginalize Quakers, I think it's important to remember that in the early 18th century Quakers made up almost one-fifth of the entire American population for a few years. They significantly influenced people like Ben Franklin who added his name to the 1791 petition to eliminate slavery.

Actually, it may be best to actually start a topic on this context - which I'll try to do soon. My point really is that the the appearance that institutionalized slavery was 'time-honored" was true only in a southern-dominated Congress and perhaps within the aristocratic plantation owners. Outside of that, there was wide discussion and a variety of views ranging from ambivalent to negative.

I realize that the issue was still a "northern" issue, yet I strongly feel that the south's protection of it - while not necessarily vocal in the mainstream south - was enormously important. As I said in another post, a south without white supremacy was very scary.


Lincoln and Slavery Issues